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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY J. UDY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
District Court No. 924000268
vs.

Court of Appeals No. 930791-CA

REBECCA UDY,
Priority Classification: 4
Defendant, Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff or "Mr. Udy") submits the
following as his brief of appellant herein:

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as
amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60 Motion. The order denying the
Motion was entered by the Honorable Gordon J. Low of the first district court, box
elder county, sitting without a jury.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial Court err in ordering Mr. Udy to pay child support to Mrs. Udy
by calculating support using a sole custody worksheet, where the parenting schedule
ordered provides that Mr. Udy care for the parties' minor child more than thirty-three
percent (33%) of the time?
Did the trial Court err by not using a joint custody worksheet in calculating
Mr. Udy's child support obligations?
Did the trial Court fail to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of
law in ruling on Mr. Udy's Motion requesting that his child support obligations be
calculated by using a joint custody worksheet?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78, Chapter 45, et. seq. may be determinative
of the outcome in this appeal.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in this appeal as to the issue presented on appeal is a
reversal of error standard, since the issue presented is one of law. Office of Recovery
Services v. VGPy 845 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion. The Order (Record On
Appeal, [hereinafter, R.O.A.] 204]) was entered in the First Judicial District Court
and for Box Elder County, by the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge
presiding.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.O.A. 167-177) were signed on
November 5, 1993, and entered by the trial Court on November 9, 1993.
An Amended Decree of Divorce was signed on November 23,1993, and entered
by the trial Court on December 1, 1993. The Amended Decree was entered by
agreement of the parties to correct the simple clerical error of a line having been
inadvertently omitted in the original Decree at the top of page seven (7). A copy of
the Amended Decree is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "A".
A Motion to Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet made pursuant
to Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah rules of civil Procedure was dated October 1, 1993,
and entered by the trial court on the same date. (R.O.A. 126-136)
3

The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying plaintiff's Motion to
Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet, which Memorandum Decision was
dated November 23, 1993 and entered by the Court on November 24, 1993. (R.O.A.
192-193)
The Order denying plaintiffs Rule 59 and 60 Motion was signed on december
8, 1993, and entered by the trial Court on December 10, 1993. (R.O.A. 204) A copy
of said Order is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "B".
The aforesaid Motion has no effect on the pendency of this appeal, and is in
fact part of this appeal. There is no motion pending pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b),
52(b), 54(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Udy were married on July 27,1987 in the City of Fielding, State
of Utah. (R.O.A. 1) One child was born as issue of their marriage, to wit: Joshua
Jay Udy, born August 1, 1990. (R.O.A. 2)
Following the birth of Joshua, Mr. and Mrs. Udy both worked full time, albeit
during different shifts. Mrs. Udy worked a day shift from 6:00 a.m. until 3:30 p.m.
and Mr. Udy worked a swing shift from 4:00 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. "This arrangement
allowed one parent to be with the child" nearly all the time "and did not require day
care for any extended time." (R.O.A. 2)
4

The parties' separation to different residences came about by Mrs. Udy leaving
the marital abode and establishing her own independent residence. At the time of
the parties' separation, they agreed that custody of Joshua would be shared.
Specifically, they agreed that each of them would care for Joshua while the other was
working, and that they would share visitation with Joshua by each of them caring for
him every alternating weekend. (R.O.A. 2-3) Mr. Udy assumed all the historic
family living expenses, including those for Joshua, other than those incurred
separately by Mrs. Udy for herself and the child while in her care.
Mr. Udy filed for divorce on September 21, 1992 requesting that the parties'
historical parenting/caretaking schedule of Joshua continue. (R.O.A. 4) The same
day, the Court issued an ex-parte order providing temporary joint custody continuing
the historical schedule pending a hearing. (R.O.A. 11-12)
A hearing was held on October 8, 1992 before Domestic Relations
Commissioner Michael Allphin. Custody of Joshua is described in the Order resulting
from the hearing as being awarded to Mrs. Udy. (R.O.A. 27) Nevertheless, the Court
provided that Joshua would continue to spend time and be cared for by Mr. and Mrs.
Udy under a shared parenting schedule, which schedule was virtually identical to
that followed by the parties prior to the divorce being initiated. (R.O.A. 28-29, 31)
The schedule provided that Joshua would be cared for by Mr. Udy about one-third of
overnights and roughly forty-five percent (45%) of the overall parenting/caretaking
5

time considering days and overnights. The Court found little historical third-party
child care and "that the child would [continue to] be better off with a natural parent
than with day care providers.1' The aforesaid Order further provided:
3.
The Court will deviate from the child support called for under a
sole custody schedule because the father will have the child for
substantial periods of time. Accordingly, the plaintiff shall pay child
support to the defendant in the amount of $150.00 per month which will
commence with the month of October, 1992. (Emphasis added)
4.
Each party shall pay one-half of any day care costs reasonably
incurred for the minor child during the time the parents are working
[and neither parent is available]. (R.O.A. 29)
If the Court had calculated Mr. Udy's child support obligations using a sole
custody worksheet, he would have been ordered to pay in the neighborhood of $275.11
per month. (R.O.A. 8-9) The Court ordered Mr. Udv to pay only $150.00 per month
because of the percentage of time ordered under the parenting/residential schedule
for Joshua to be cared for by Mr. Udv.
The Court also directed that if the parties continued to disagree upon a final
resolution of the custody/parenting schedule issue, that the parties were to attempt
to agree upon a person to perform a custody evaluation. (R.O.A. 29)
From October, 1992 through the first part of January, 1993, the parties
continued working different shifts and Joshua spent nearly equal time being care for
by each parent. (R.O.A. 46) Towards the end of 1992, Mr. Tidy's employer offered
him an opportunity to work the day shift, which shift he had desired to work for
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approximately five (5) years. (R.O.A. 248) Mr. Udy commenced working day shift
during the first part of January, 1993. (R.O.A. 47) Notwithstanding Mr. tidy's shift
change, he urged the court to maintain the parenting/residential schedule and
caretaking time percentages for Joshua (R.O.A. 47), though the historical schedule
would have needed some modification.
Subsequent to the aforesaid October 8, 1992, hearing, the parties experienced
difficulties in agreeing to a particular person to perform the evaluation concerning
the best custody and parenting schedule arrangements for Joshua. (R.O.A. 47-51,5557, 71-72)
A hearing held before Commissioner Allphin on February 11, 1993, produced
a Recommendation and Order providing:
a)

The evaluation of Joshua's best interests would be performed by

both Dr. Brent Price and Dr. Derek Mason to "cooperate and work jointly, if possible,"
with Mr. and Mrs. Udy paying each of them respectively. (R.O.A. 81-82)
b)

Mrs. tidy's interests in the parenting and caretaking of Joshua

were continued to be labeled "sole custody". Mr. Udy's parenting/caretaking interests
described as "visitation" were rescheduled to a rather standard arrangement. This
rescheduling caused a reduction in the overnights with Joshua to less than twentyfive percent (25%) and the total parenting/caretaking time including days and
overnights, to roughly thirty percent (30%). (R.O.A. 82-83)
7

c)

Mr. Udy's child support obligations were increased to $275.00 per

month in addition to any day care expenses for Joshua. (R.O.A. 83)
On or about April 21, 1993, Dr. Derek T. Mason submitted his custody
evaluation with conclusions and recommendations. Dr. Mason concluded that Mr.
Udy's "determination to continue to play and important part in his son's life is
impressive". (Mason's evaluation, at 7) In Dr. Mason's recommendations, he found
that, "Brad is a loving, caring parent and I think it critical that he have more time
with his son. Therefore I would urge the court to allow expanded visitation between
Joshua and Brad, something that will certainly be to Joshua's benefit." (Mason's
evaluation, at 7)
On or bout April 30,1993, Dr. T. Brent Price submitted his custody evaluation
with recommendations. In his evaluation, Dr. Price noted pursuant to RJA Rule 4903, the following under section "C" entitled, The relative strength of the child's bond
with one or both of the prospective custodians: "[Joshua] has spent most of his time
with both of his parents. He is attached to his father and mother as evidenced by the
observation and interaction with both parents and with Joshua." Dr. Price further
noted under section "D": "Joshua seems to be doing rather well by dividing his time
between his parents. He needs both of this parents at this stage of his life. Brad
would like more time with his son."
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The parenting/residential schedule originally implemented by the Order dated
October 8, 1992 (R.O.A. 27), with Joshua spending about thirty-three percent (33%)
of overnights with Mr. Udy, had been scaled back to less than twenty-five percent
(25%) under the Order of February 11, 1993 (R.O.A. 82-83).

Dr. Price's

recommendations stressed that "Brad should have increased visitation", and
suggested an every-other-day arrangement.
Recommendations)

(Dr. Price's evaluation, under

While recommending this substantial increase, he further

recommended that "The court should caution Becky about the importance of allowing
Brad to have regular scheduled visitation."

(Dr. Price's evaluation, under

Recommendations)
On or about May 7, 1993 a Settlement Conference was held before the
Honorable Gordon J. Low. Both parties were ordered to submit a "Status Report" on
the contested issues of the case within thirty (30) days. (R.O.A. 94)
Mrs. Udv's Status Report On or about May 20,1993, Mrs. Udy submitted her
Status Report. (R.O.A. 97-101) Under the Visitation section therein, she states she
"is willing to allow expanded visitation" (R.O.A. 97) and thereafter sets forth a
schedule (R.O.A. 97-98) providing but few overnights beyond the "Minimum Schedule
for Visitation" provided in Utah Code §30-3-35 enacted by the Utah Legislature in
1993. She then "Note[s that] 78-45-2(7) defines joint physical custody when the child
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stays with the parent overnight more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the year (.25
x 365 = 91.25 nights)." (R.O.A. 98)
Under the Child Support section of her Report she states, "The Uniform Child
Support Worksheet [for less than 25% overnights with Mr. Udy] shows Bradley would
pay $268.00 per month in child support. Rebecca's share is $166.00. Bradley is now
paying $275.00 per month in child support." (R.O.A. 98) Further, that "Bradley Udv
may say he is entitled to calculate support based on a Joint Custody Worksheet if he
has Joshua more than 91.25 nights a year. If so, Rebecca Udy will likewise follow the
law on that matter

" (Emphasis added) (R.O.A. 99)

Mr. Udy*s Status Report On or about June 2, 1993, Mr. Udy submitted his
Status Report to the Court. He notes under the section dealing with CUSTODY:
"Each [custody evaluator] recommends expanded visitation more than
normally provided almost to the extent of joint custody. Thus far, the
parties are unable to agree as to what 'expanded visitation' means.
Brad Udy would essentially like the child approximately one-half of the
time and agrees that his wife should have the child approximately onehalf of the time. During the initial period after the divorce was filed the
child essentially spent half the time with Brad and half the time with
Becky. This occurred from the months of October, 1992 through
January, 1993. In January, 1993 both parties began working the same
shift, and the time Brad had the child diminished.
(R.O.A. 104-105)

Under his VISITATION section, after reiterating the reduced

schedule then in place, Mr. Udy states :
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Becky has refused any more visitation.
Brad is suggesting an every other week visitation with a midweek visitation for the parent with the off week. This would limit it to
three day maximum away from either parent at one time, allowing Josh
to be raised by both parents. (R.O.A. 106)
Then in his CHILD SUPPORT section he states:
Brad Udy is willing to pay child support based upon his 1992 and
her 1992 W-2 statements. The court needs to determine whether this
is, in fact, a joint custody arrangement as opposed to a sole custody
arrangement, to compute child support accurately. (Emphasis added)
(R.O.A. 106)
A one day trial was held before the Honorable Gordon J. Low on September 1,
1993. Mr. Udy testified that Joshua's best interest would be served by a joint custody
arrangement and that a mediation process could resolve any differences between the
parties (R.O.A. 247), but that they had no particular philosophical diflFerences in
raising Joshua. (R.O.A. 248)
Both parties testified that during the summer of 1993 — a period subsequent
to Drs. Mason and Price completing their evaluations ~ that the parenting/residential
schedule was basically equal. (R.O.A. 249 and Defendant's Exhibit #1) Mrs. Udy
testified that during the aforesaid summer Brad had spent "about 46 percent of the
time with Josh", that such a parenting/residential schedule should continue. (R.O.A.
303) She also testified that Joshua would adjust well to any new schedule ordered
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by the court, including after he commences school, so long as the parties Hve in the
same school area. (R.O.A. 303-304)
Mr. Udy testified that Joshua's interests would be best served by a
parenting/residential schedule alternating weekly (R.O.A. 249-250), but if the Court
was not agreeable to such, that extended "weekends begin perhaps on Wednesday and
run through Sunday night" would provide Joshua the most stable set schedule.
(R.O.A. 251)
Under cross-examination by Mrs. Udy's counsel, Mr. Udy distinguished
between quality verses the quantity of time with Joshua:
Q.
Is it true that you feel that the quantity of time with the
child, 50/50 time with each parent, is very important?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.
You feel that the amount of time, 50/50 time, is more
important than the quality or the kind of time you spend with this boy,
isn't that correct?
A.

Of course not. Quality time is much better.

Q.
And if you were to receive a block of time that was just
quality time, would that be more important to you or would you prefer
to have 50/50 time?
A. Quality time is great, yes, but I see no reason why there should
not be the 50/50 time. That is how he's been raised his entire life. I
believe it would be altering that to go otherwise now.
(R.O.A. 278-279)
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On examination from her own counsel, Mrs. Udy testified that she had no
trouble with a schedule providing that Joshua be cared for by Mr. Udy from
Wednesday through Sunday evening on alternating weeks, so long as she could spend
a couple hours with Joshua after work before Mr. Udy picked him up.
Under cross-examination, Mrs. Udy testified that Joshua adjusted well to the
relatively equal parenting schedule experienced during the summer of 1993 and that
Joshua did well during that summer (R.O.A. 315). Further, that Joshua was stable
at both parent's homes while sharing equal parenting time for more than a week at
a time with each parent, stating, "He does good with it". (R.O.A. 317)
Mr. Udy also testified that a significant portion of his monthly budget is used
to provide directly for Joshua or which are attributable to him, over and above the
child support he pays to Mrs. Udy, including the following:

Additional utility

expenses, life insurance, a portion of the house payment, daycare, food, clothing, book
club, and savings for college. (R.O.A. 235-236 and Plaintiffs trial Exhibit #2) A copy
of said trial Exhibit is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "C".
At the conclusion of the trial, the court granted "sole custody to the defendant"
(R.O.A. 144), then went on "to expand that sole custody somewhat over the legislative
gxiidelines and schedule." (R.O.A. 145) The Amended Decree of Divorce provides in
part, as follows:
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3.
VISITATION
The court will adopt the legislative guidelines for visitation as
promulgated under UTAH CODE ANN §30-3-35, and in addition will
give the following expanded visitation:
(a)
On the weekend in which the father will have the
child, he may pick the child up Wednesday evening at 6:30 p.m.
and may keep the child Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and shall
return the child Sunday at 7:00 p.m. to the mother's home.
(b)
On the week when the father does not have the child
for his weekend, he shall be entitled to have the child Wednesday
evening from 3:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
(R.O.A. 195; See also transcript of ruling, R.O.A. at 145-146) Notwithstanding that
the aforesaid schedule provides that Joshua be cared for by Mr. Udy on thirty-three
percent (33%) of the overnights throughout each year (R.O.A. 136), the Court orally
stated in its decision:

"The child support will be pursuant to the sole custody

schedule and pursuant to Defendant's Exhibit No. 5." (R.O.A. 149) Based thereon,
the Amended Decree of Divorce provides in part, as follows:
4.
CHILD SUPPORT
The court shall calculate child support based upon a sole custody
worksheet. For purposes of computing the child support worksheet, the
father will have gross income of $2,786.00 per month and the mother
will have gross income of $1,720.00 per month; the father will receive a
credit of $22.00 per month for medical insurance which he provides,
which leaves the plaintiff to pay the sum of $273.00 per month as and
for child support for the minor child.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Child Support Guidelines define "joint physical custody" at Utah Code
Section 78-45-2(7) as "the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 25%
of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to
paying child support." Under the schedule ordered by the trial court during which
each parent is responsible for caring for Joshua, Mr. Udy has the child during 46%
of the total time and 33% of the overnights. Mr. Udy also directly contributes more
than Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month for Joshua's financial benefit in
addition to paying child support to Mrs. Udy. Given the aforesaid schedule and
financial contribution, the Guidelines presume that Joshua's best interest is served
by calculating child support using a "joint-custody worksheet".
A computation of Mr. Udy's child support using a joint custody worksheet,
results in an obligation as low as $53.00 per month and in no case higher than
$112.00 per month. The aforesaid difference depends on whether the 46% total time
or just the 33% of the overnights is considered in the calculation. In either case, the
trial court erred in ordering the parties to calculate child support using a
"sole-custody worksheet", resulting in Mr. Udy having a $273.00 per month support
obligation.
The trial court deviated from the child support guidelines in ordering the
parties to compute child support by using a "sole-custody worksheet". The trial Court
15

made no findings which support a deviation from said guidelines nor any findings
which rebut the presumption of the guidelines being applicable to this matter.
Mr. Udy properly brought a timely Motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to correct the trial Court's legal, non-clerical mistake. The
trial Court erred in denying said Motion.
This Court should reverse the trial Court's Order that child support be
calculated by using a "sole-custody worksheet" and direct the trial Court to compute
child support using a "joint-custody worksheet. In the alternative, this Court should
remand directing the trial Court to enter findings which may support a deviation
from the child support guidelines and which could rebut the presximption of said
guidelines being appropriate for this case.

ARGUMENT:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING CHILD
SUPPORT USING A SOLE-CUSTODY WORKSHEET RATHER
THAN A JOINT-CUSTODY WORKSHEET.

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES' DEFINITION OF "JOINT PHYSICAL
CUSTODY" WHEN CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT UNDER
THE PARENTING/RESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE ORDERED.
In awarding custody of the parties' minor child, Joshua Udy, the Court granted
"sole custody to the defendant" (R.O.A. 144), then went on "to expand that sole
16

custody somewhat over the legislative guidelines and schedule."

(R.O.A. 145)

Concerning the custody of Joshua, the Amended Decree of Divorce provides, "The
care, custody and control of the minor child, JOSHUA J. UDY, born August 1, 1990,
shall be awarded to the defendant." (R.O.A. 195, Amended Decree, Page 2, Paragraph
2) The Court did not differentiate in its award, between legal and physical custody.
Mrs. Udy's custody of Joshua was expanded to include Mr. Udy having the care and
control over Joshua while in his custody under the extensive "visitation" schedule
ordered by the Court.
Throughout this brief, the schedule under which the trial court ordered that
Joshua be under the care of each respective parent is referred to as the
"parenting/residential schedule" for the child.

Both the words, "custody" and

"visitation" are derived historically from a criminal law context in which a person is
taken into custody by law enforcement personnel and allowed visitation by family and
friends. Such terms have been employed in a family law context as a matter of
convenience in legal expression. Nevertheless, their use in a family law context
actually demeans the child to a status perhaps below even that of mere property, and
likens the child's parental caretaking responsibilities to that of a warden over a
prisoner. (See The Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Differentiation Between
Fabricated and Genuine Child Sex Abuse, Richard A. Gardner, M.D., Creative
Therapeutics, 1988, Chapter Two, "Brief Review of Western Society's Changing
17

Attitudes Regarding Parental Preference in Custody Disputes".)
In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah App. 1991), the Court
indicated that the "custody" and "visitation" labels are not as important as the
description given those terms by the Court in defining their meaning in a given case
context.1
The label ascribed by the trial court to the time schedule under which Joshua
is to spend with each of his parents in the instant case is not as important as the

1

The Court noted the following at footnote #1 in
Thronson:
Custody terminology:
Many legislators, judges and
writers have been loose with their "joint" custody language.
Early articles identified this vexing problem as follows:
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, split, joint]
following divorce and the terms which describe them are
vague and overlapping. The lack of standard definitions
and
the courts' tendency
to use certain
terms
interchangeably have created confusion.
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following
Divorce,
12 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 523, 525 (1979).
Often,
when
referring
to one of these
custody
arrangements, courts use vague language or inadequately
defined terms.
Bratt, Joint
Custody,
67 Ky.L.J. 271, 283 1978-79).
One author points out that considerable
semantic
confusion has resulted possibly because the "term" joint
custody predates the "concept" of joint custody as it is known
today. He states: "I have encountered at least fifteen terms
used to refer to various alternatives to sole custody: joint
legal custody, joint physical custody, divided custody,
separate custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody,
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given to neither
party to the exclusion of the other,' temporary custody,
shifting custody, and concurrent custody."
Miller,
Joint
Custody,
13(3) Fam.L.Q. 245, 360 n. 79 (1979)
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meaning intended by the court in employing the terms. In this matter, the trial
Court denoted as "visitation" the time during which Joshua would, in essence, be
under the actual care, physical custody and control, of Mr. Udy, and denoted as "sole
custody" all the other times in which he would be under the same of Mrs. Udy. In
using the labels "custody" and "visitation", the trial Court appropriately established
a schedule during which the parenting, caretaking, control, and other related
responsibilities of Joshua's upbringing, for each parent would be ascribed. The trial
Court thereby defined a "parenting/residential schedule" as referred to herein.
The Uniform Civil Liability For Support Act, Utah Code Section 78-45-1 et. seq.
is commonly referred to as the child support "Guidelines" as defined at §78-45-2(6)
therein. Said Guidelines specify the criteria which differentiate between calculating
support based on differing parenting/residential schedules. The criteria of cases (§7845-7.9) labeled "joint physical custody" differs from cases (§78-45-7.7) other than
"joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2," in only one
aspect. (Emphasis added) That aspect, set forth in §78-45-7.9(3) is the consideration
of "the percentage of time the children spend with the other parent" as a factor. In
cases other than "joint physical and split custody (§78-45-7.7) the percentage of time
the children spend with each parent is not a factor. A copy of the aforesaid Sections
is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "D".
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The Guidelines provide at §78-45-2(7) that insofar as calculating child support
is concerned, the definition of"'Joint physical custody' means the child stays with
each parent overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support."
Such definition requires two criteria to be met:

First, that of the total

percentage of time, that at least 25% of the child's overnights be spent with each
parent, and second, that expenses on behalf of the child be contributed by the parents
over and above their support obligations.
Fulfillment of the first criteria: Regardless of the "sole-custody" label used by
the trial court, it "expand[ed] that sole custody somewhat over the legislative
guidelines and schedule" (R.O.A. 145). The parenting/residential schedule ordered
by the trial court provides that Mr. Udy care for Joshua 33% of the overnights and
46% of the total percentage of time. Obviously the foregoing percentages surpass the
threshold requirement of "overnight[s] for more than 25% of the year".
The time periods during which Mr. Udy is responsible for caring for Joshua,
labeled as "visitation" in the Amended Decree, and the calculations of child support
using two different joint custody worksheets, were set forth in an attachment (R.O.A.
128, 132, and 136) to Mr. Udy^s Rule 60 Motion to Base Child Support on Joint
Custody Worksheet (R.O.A. 126-7). Said attachment is attached hereto as Exhibit
"E".
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The first worksheet (R.O.A. 128), incorporates only the overnight "percentage
of time each parent has the children". Line 2 of said Worksheet indicates Mrs. and
Mr. Udy have Joshua overnight on 245 and 120 occasions respectively. Line 3 of said
Worksheet correctly calculates the percentage of overnights as being 67.12% and
32.88% respectively. Said Worksheet calculates Mr. Udy's support obligation to Mrs.
Udy to be $116.00 per month.
The second worksheet (R.O.A. 132-3), calculates Mr. Udy*s support obligation
considering the days, as well as the overnights, during which Joshua is in Mr. Udy*s
care. Line 2 of said Worksheet correctly shows a total of 168 days and overnights
with Mr. Udy equating to 46.03% of said time as reflected on Line 3 therein. Said
Worksheet calculates Mr. Udy's support obligation to Mrs. Udy to be only $53.00 per
month.
Fulfillment of the second criteria: In establishing the second criteria, the Utah
Legislature recognized the likelihood, though not inevitable certainty, of parents
directly contributing more to their children's financial support than shown by their
obligations in the worksheet calculation.
Mr. Udy did demonstrate to the trial court that he had historically contributed
since the parties' separation, and continued to contribute significant sums, to
Joshua's expenses in addition to paying child support to Mrs. Udy.
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Early on during the trial, Mr. Udy introduced into evidence his monthly Budget
as Plaintiffs trial Exhibit #2, which was received by the Court. A copy of said
Exhibit is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". As shown thereon, the following sums are
attributable to expenses Mr. Udy is incurring and satisfying for Joshua's direct
benefit, in addition to support he pays to Mrs. Udy:
JOSHUA'S
EXPENSE
Mountain Fuel
Utah Power & Light
Tremonton City
Insight Cable
GTE Telephone
Life Insurance
House Payment

TOTAL
44.95
17.78
30.82
38.25
28.49
30.00
461.50

PORTION
1 1 . 242
4.453
7.71"
0
0
30.005
153.836

2

This amount is derived by calculating Joshua's portion as
being only 25% of the total monthly amount incurred. Such 25% is
a conservative allocation of the additional expense being
contributed by Mr. Udy for Joshua above that which he would incur
without Joshua under the ordered parenting/residential schedule.
3

Same as footnote 2.

4

Same as footnote 2.

5

Joshua is designated as the beneficiary of Mr. Udy's Life
insurance policy.
6

This amount is derived by calculating Joshua's portion as
being only 33% of the total monthly amount incurred. Such 33% is
a conservative allocation of the additional expense being
contributed by Mr. Udy for Joshua over that which he would incur
without Joshua under the parenting/residential schedule. Mrs. Udy
expends only $200.00 per month for housing for her and Joshua.
(See Mrs. Udy's [Defendant's] trial Exhibit No. 3)
Mr. Udy
continues to meet the housing expense of the marital residence to
provide stability and constancy for Joshua.
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Kidland Daycare
Child Support
Food for Josh and Brad
Clothes - Brad
Clothes - Josh
Josh's Book club
Automotive Expenses
Gift Fund
Misc. Spending Money
Emergency Fund-Savings
Doctor/Dentist/Medication

07
0

118.44
275.00
148.01
33.33
20.83
13.00
113.88
79.17
173.33
216.67
43.82

TOTAL:

$1,887.37

37,.008
0
20..83
13,.00
0
25,.00q
0
.OO
25, 10
10..J6}1
$328,.06

As can be seen by the above, Mr. Udy expends and financially contributes
$328.06 per month directly for Joshua's benefit in addition to paying child support,
including day care as part of such support. Such a sum certainly meets the requisites
of the second legislative criteria. Even if this Court were to take a more conservative
view in the allocation of Joshua's portion of Mr. Udy's expenses, or eliminate entirely
some of the expense categories attributed to Joshua, Mr. Udy would still demonstrate

7

portion,
8

This expense c a t e g o r y i s not i n c l u d e d
i t b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d p a r t of c h i l d s u p p o r t .

in

Joshua's

Same as f o o t n o t e 2 .

9

The second page of Mr. Udy's Budget a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as
E x h i b i t "D", shows J o s h u a ' s annual p o r t i o n b e i n g $300.00, which sum
e q u a l s t o $25.00 p e r month.
10

$25.00 of t h e $216.67 monthly t o t a l can c o n s e r v a t i v e l y be
a t t r i b u t e d t o J o s h u a ' s c o l l e g e fund as shown on t h e second page of
Mr. Udy's Monthly budget, a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as E x h i b i t "D".
11

Same a s f o o t n o t e 2 .
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a significant financial "contribution] to the expenses of [Joshua] in addition to paying
child support".
Mr. Udy demonstrated to the trial court more than sufficient evidence to show
having fulfilled the two criteria necessary to apply the definition in §78-45-2(7) of
"joint physical custody" for the purposes of calculating child support. The trial court
erred in refusing to apply the child support Guidelines by ordering the parties to use
a "sole-custody" worksheet for calculating support.
The label of sole custody of Joshua to Mrs. Udy by the trial Court is not as
important as the meaning intended by the Court when considering the
parenting/residential schedule it ordered. Suppose a law clerk were offered an job
position for which the clerk was paid hourly, and the employer labeled the job as a
"full-time" position, yet it was clearly understood between the employer and the law
clerk that the clerk's working time would average thirty (30) hours per week. The
clerk certainly wouldn't expect to be paid for forty (40) hours per week merely
because the employer labeled the job as a "full-time position. Likewise, a juice
manufacturer who combines cranberry and apple juice in a single drink may wish to
label the juice as apple juice. Nevertheless, the juice would still be "cran-apple" to
the taste.
Joshua's parenting/residential schedule, labeled "custody" and "visitation" by
the trial court, clearly provides a 46/54% division of the total time and a 33/67% of
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the overnights between the parties. The percentage of time Joshua spends with each
parent is the paramount factor in determining which method is used in calculating
child support, not the labels relating to the parenting/residential schedule.
Joshua will be four years old on August 1, 1994. During the remaining period
of Joshua's minority - the period during which Mr. Udy will have child support
obligations to Mrs. Udy --, Mr. Udy will expend approximately Fifty-Five Thousand
Dollars ($55,000.00) contributing directly for Joshua's financial benefit based on
$328.06 per month. Of course, this sum does not account for any increase in cost of
living expenses for Joshua over the next fourteen (14) years. A substantial increase
is inevitable over such a time period.
Calculating Mr. Udy's child support obligation Under a joint custody worksheet
arrives at a monthly obligation of either $53.00 or $116.00, depending on whether the
total 46% of the time, or just the 33% of the overnights are used, as is further
discussed immediately below. Under the trial court's child support order of $273.00
per month, Mr. Udy would be required to pay approximately $45,000.00 as child
support to Mrs. Udy during Joshua's minority, not considering any support increases
which may occur during such time.
It would be patently unjust to require Mr. Udy to pay Mrs. Udy $45,000.00
during Joshua's minority, while directly contributing $55,000.00 at present day dollar
value to Joshua's financial benefit, the majority of such $55,000.00 being incurred
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because of the parenting/residential schedule found by the trial court to be in
Joshua's best interest.
Mr. Udy's direct contribution to Joshua's financial benefit under the
parenting/residential schedule inevitably reduces by a significant sum, the expenses
Mrs. Udy would otherwise incur were she required to care and provide for Joshua
under a sole-custody schedule where Joshua only spent every-other weekend and
occasional other times.
In Mrs. Udy's "Status Report" filed with the trial Court on or about May 20,
1993, she states: "Bradley Udy may say he is entitled to calculate support based on
a joint Custody Worksheet if he has Joshua more than 91.25 nights a year. If so,
Rebecca Udy will likewise follow the law on that matter...." (Emphasis added) Mr.
Udy has the responsibility of caring for Joshua a total of 120 overnights during each
year. The child support order should follow the law on that matter.
Utah's definition of "joint physical custody" for the purposes of calculating child
support "means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% of the
year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support". (§78-45-2(7). Use of Utah's "Minimum schedule for visitation" enacted
as §30-3-35 in 1993, results in roughly 18% of the overnights being spent with the
"non-custodial parent".
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Utah's use of a threshold requirement of at least 25% of the overnights for
"joint physical custody" calculation purposes, is similar to most states throughout the
country when computing support in such cases. A publication dated mid-June, 1991,
by The Joint Custody Association, a national child advocacy organization based in Los
Angeles and formed at least fifteen years ago, points out the commonality that Utah's
"joint physical custody" calculation has with most other states. A copy of the relevant
portion of said publication is attached hereto as Exhibit "F".
The publication lists a total of thirty-eight states and quotes from their child
support statutes. Each of those states provide that support be calculated differently
when the child spends significantly more time with one parent than calculated under
a standard-type - every-other weekend and holidays, and part of the summer schedule. Many of those states' child support guidelines recognize that under a
schedule such as in this case, significantly lower support is appropriate because the
"non-custodial parent" is incurring a larger direct contribution to the child's financial
support and the "custodial parent" is expending less because of such contribution.
As recent as December, 1993, the Child Support Advisory Committee for
California recommended further use of different worksheets or tables for computing
child support obligations where the visitation schedule exceeds 25% of the childs time
with one parent. See Review of Statewide Child Support Guideline, Section 5.3-5.5
and 9.9 attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "G".
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The Order denying Mr. Udy's Rule 60 Motion attached hereto as Exhibit "B
provides in part as follows: "Child support will be as ordered in the Decree of Divorce
based on a sole custody worksheet for the reasons set forth in Defendant's response."
A copy of Mrs. Udy's response (R.O.A. 137-140) is attached hereto and incorporated
as Exhibit "H".
In her response Mrs Udy claims in Paragraph 1 that no subsection of Rule 60 can
justify Mr. Udy's Motion. As explained below in Section III, Mr. Udy's motion that
support be calculated using a "joint custody worksheet" is valid under either clause
(Dor (7) of Rule 60.
In Paragraphs 2 and 3 of her response, Mrs. Udy argues that the trial court
consistently order child support based on the "sole custody" temporary award of
October 8, 1992 and in the divorce on September 1, 1993.

As noted above,

Commissioner Alphin who issued the October 8, 1992 Order specifically did not
calculate support using a sole custody worksheet because of Joshua being in Mr.
Udy's care for approximately 33% of the overnights and 46% of the total time.
Mr. Udy's Rule 60 motion was procedurally proper to bring attention to the court
the necessity and propriety of correcting a legal substantive judicial error. Mr. Udy
properly brought his motion, as is discussed further below in Section III, to
appropriately avoid the necessity of pursuing an appeal.
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Mrs. Udy contends in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of her response that Mr. Udy failed to
meet the second criteria of S78-45-2C7), that he did not
show that he paid any sum for Joshua's financial benefit beyond merely paying
support to Mrs. Udy. As is discussed above, Mr. Udy demonstrated to the trial court
that he does so in fact expend a significant sum for Joshua's financial benefit in
addition to paying support to Mrs. Udy. Mrs. Udy is obviously not paying for all the
"basic needs for the child", nor does Mr. Udy merely spend "for the child's needs just
like every other father who has visitation" as Mrs. Udy attempts to argue in her
response.
Mrs. Udy acknowledges in Paragraph 7 of her response the propriety
of Mr. Udy bringing his Rule 60 Motion for "error at law" and that propriety is
further discussed in Section III below. Yet Mrs. Udy further contends in the same
Paragraph that the trial court took all the factors enumerated in S78-45-7(3) into
consideration to rebut the guidelines. Nowhere did the trial court set out specific
findings on the factors as required by S78-45-7(3), which lack of findings is further
discussed in Section II below.
Mrs. Udy last argues in Paragraph 8 of her response that Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b)
Motion is improper under Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966). Said case
dealt specifically with a Rule 59 Motion for new trial, not one brought under Rule 60
for correction of mistake of law and noted:
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[W]e also recognize that there by be situations when an order
denying or granting a new trial may have been made by inadvertence
or mistake, or when there was some irregularity in connection with the
obtaining or the granting of the order, in which instance the court could
of course act to correct any such mistake or irregularity.
(Drury, at 664.)
Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b) Motion sought to address and correct just such a mistake
or irregularity as is further supported in his argument contained in Section III below.
The instant matter is a case of first impression in Utah. It is important that
in issuing its decision, the Court provide clear guidance as to applying the law to the
facts of this case.
Subsection (3) of §78-45-7.9 Joint physical custody - Obligation calculations^
implies that the total "percentage of time the children spend with the other parent",
not just the minimum requisite of 25% of the overnights in §78-45-2(7), be used when
calculating support. This Court should reverse the trial court's calculation of Mr.
Udy's $273.00 per month support obligation and remand to the trial Court directing
it to include the 46% total "percentage of time" and set Mr. Udy's base support
obligation to Mrs. Udy at $53.00 per month. In the alternative, this Court should
reverse and remand to include the 33% of overnights and set Mr. Udy's base support
obligation to Mrs. Udy at $116.00 per month. Both of the aforesaid sums are arrived
as under the calculations shown in Exhibit "E" herein.
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II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT
UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO THE
AMOUNT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD. SPECIFICALLY, THE
FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A DEVIATION FROM,
AND TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF, THE GUIDELINES BEING
IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILD,
Utah Code Section 78-45-7.2(2)&(3) provides as follows:
(2)
(a)
The child support guidelines shall be applied as a
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of
temporary or permanent child support.
(b)
The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and
considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts
resulting from the application of the guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3)
A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering
an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust,
inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case
is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case.
In the instant case, the trial court ordered a parenting/residential schedule
which provides that Mr. Udy care for Joshua 46% of the total time and 33% of the
overnights. Such a schedule, along with Mr. Udy's direct contribution of $328.06 per
month to Joshua's expenses, is in conformance with the definition of "joint physical
custody" pursuant to S78-45-2(7). For the purposes of calculating Mr. Udy*s child
support obligation, a joint custody worksheet should have been employed.
In Hill u. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724-725 (Utah App. 1992) the Court noted that,

31

[F]ailure of the trial court to consider and make findings on
statutorily mandated factors is itself an abuse of discretion. See,
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Utah App. 1988).
* * *

In order to rebut this satutory presumption, the trial court must
make a finding that use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate
or not in the best interest of the child Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-7.2(3)
(1992).* * * The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
apply the presumptive guidelines and determined child support outside
the guidelines without finding there were specidal circumstances that
justified deviation. See, Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.21d 909,911 (Utah
App. 1988).

The trial court's order that the parties use a sole custody worksheet for
calculating child support is a deviation from the guidelines. The trial court made no
finding supporting a deviation from the guidelines. It made no finding that using a
joint custody worksheet to calculate child support would be "unjust, inappropriate,
or not in the best interest of the child" as required by §78-45-7.2(2)&(3) referred to
above.
Absent the court reversing the trial court's order of using a sole-custody
worksheet, the court should remand to the trial court directing it to enter specific
findings supporting a rebuttal of the presumption of using a joint custody worksheet
under the circumstances of this case.
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Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. UDYS
MOTION BROUGHT UNDER URCP RULE 60 FOR
CORRECTION OF JUDICIAL LEGAL ERROR.
On or about October 1, 1993, Mr. Udy brought a Motion under Rules 59 and
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate his child support obligation using
a Joint Physical Custody Worksheet. Said Motion was opposed by Mrs. Udy in her
response filed on or about 13,1993. The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision
denying Mr. Udy's Motion on November 23,1993 and entered the same on November
24, 1993. An Order denying Mr. Udy's Motion was signed on December 8, 1993, and
entered by the trial Court on December 10, 1993. Mr. Udy pursues this appeal
regarding the aforesaid denial. Pursuant to an Order dated and entered on February
7, 1994 by this Court, Mr. Udy's appeal is limited to the issue brought in his Motion
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is procedurally proper for an issue concerning judicial legal error to be
brought under Rule 60(b). Said rule provides in part, as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;... or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the j u d g m e n t
(Emphasis added)
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On a number of occasions, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have dealt
with issues brought by motions under URCP Rule 60(b). Nevertheless, very few Utah
cases address the propriety of applying said rule to judicial legal error. Where Utah's
decisions may lack specificity, as to employing Rule 60(b) to address judicial
nonclerical error, the decisions of other jurisdictions lend clarity to support its
appropriateness.
The trial court's decision to calculate child support using a sole custody
worksheet, notwithstanding the court's provision of a joint physical custody
parenting/residential schedule, may be challenged under two concepts: First, that
"mistake" as included in reason (1), applies to judicial nonclerical error; and
alternatively under reason (7), that equity and fairness justify relief from the
consequences of thus calculating child support under the visitation schedule ordered.
A.

"Mistake" as included in reason (1) of Rule 60(b), applies to
judicial nonclerical substantial error.
1.

Utah Decisions - Controlling Authority.

The decisions rendered in Utah support the propriety of a Rule 60(b) motion
addressing judicial, nonclerical error under the category of mistake of reason (1)
thereunder.
Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970), distinguished between a
motion addressing clerical error, properly brought under subsection (a) of Rule 60,
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and a motion for judicial error under subsection (b) of the rule:
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does
not depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was
made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as
rendered. (Emphasis added)
The instant case involves the error made by the trial court in rendering the
judgment concerning the support ordered for a child.
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), dealt with a Rule 60(b) motion to
set aside a default judgment establishing paternity and support for an unrepresented
minor child. The court noted at 55,
[A] judgment in a paternity case may affect the rights and
interests of the child, who is almost always unrepresented in a paternity
proceeding.
In the instant case, the interest of the child were a matter of
concern to the trial court at the hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion.
Though the Larsen Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the HLA tests
were sufficiently conclusive to establish paternity, it reversed the child support
judgment and remanded for evidentiary hearing on the issue of the child support
award. Larsen points out the importance to the child of equitable and legally correct
determinations of child support, where the father sought under Rule 60(b), a
recalculation of support to effect a reduction of the same.
See also, Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1982)
(Mistake of law raises a rule 60(b)(1) issue.)
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2.

Decisions of Other Jurisdictions - Persuasive Authority.

The decisions rendered in other jurisdictions provide authority recognizing the
propriety of using a Rule 60(b) motion to correct judicial nonclerical error. The cases
support that "mistake" referred to in reason (1) of the rule includes mistake on the
part of the court, and should be construed to authorized relief from a substantive
error of law by the court, upon a proper motion made within a reasonable time, not
exceeding the time allowed for appeal from the judgment, where such error is
apparent upon the record. Said cases argue that the trial court should have power
to correct its own judicial error under the time constraints of the rule, that the word
"mistake" is broader that the phrase "error of law apparent upon the record," and
that, so limited, a motion for such relief under Rule 60(b)(1) infuses the needed
flexibility into the procedure and allows the trial court to correct judicial error that
must otherwise be corrected by appeal.
In actual practice, a number of courts have held or recognized that correcting
judicial error, mistake, or granting relief with respect thereto, is authorized by or
permissible under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter
FRCP). Said part of the Federal Rule is identical to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
A motion for relief under FRCP Rule 60(b)(1) is a sound procedural device for
correcting a trial judge's error, for it allows a trial judge an opportunity to correct his
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or her own error, thereby either obviating an appeal or at least demonstrating to the
appellate court that the question was squarely presented and passed on below.
In Rumsey v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 580 F.Supp. 1052, 1054
(1984), the Court stated:
[Defendants argue that Rule 60(b) cannot provide the basis for
relief from the judgment of a court if the only ground asserted in
support of the motion is a substantive error by the court. This Court
rejects defendant's reasoning in this regard as a basis for a denial of the
instant motion.
On balance, this Court concludes that judicial error may be
corrected pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, see Compton v. Alton
Steamship Co., Inc., 608 F.2d (4th Cir. 1979), provided the movant is not
thereby permitted to avoid the time constraints required for taking a
timely appeal. "Under such circumstances there is indeed good sense in
permitting the [district] court to correct its own error...; no good purpose
is served by requiring the parties to appeal to a higher court, often
requiring remand for further...proceedings, when the [district] court is
equally able to correct its decisions.../' Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d at
531 (2nd Cir. 1964).
In Jones v. Anderson-Tully Co., 722 F.2d 211, 212-213 (1984), the Court
confirmed the propriety of using a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to correct substantive judicial
error, stating:
The mistake in the present case affects the substantive rights of
the parties. It is not clerical, and if in fact occurred, it is one of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect governed by Rule 60(b)(1)....
Likewise, in Parks v. U. S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 839-840 (1982),
the court stated:
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Rule 60(b)(1) authorized a court to grant relief from judgments for
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The "mistakes"
of judges may be remedied under this provision. Meadows v. Cohen,
409 F.2d 750, 752 n.4 5th Cir. 1969). The rule encompasses mistakes
in the application of the law. Oliver v. Home Indemnity Co., 470 F.2d
329 5th Cir. 1972).
The policy favoring such a construction is, of course, one aimed at
preventing the unnecessary wasting of energies by both appellate
courts and litigants. It seems that absent the chance of serious
injury to the rights of any party, the possible saving of judicial
energies warrants the use of such a discretionary reconsideration
by the district court.
470 F.2d at 331 (footnote omitted)
Judicial economy and common sense dictated filing a 60(b) motion
before the trial court rather than arguing the new law before the
appeals court.
Permitting the district court to have the first bite at the issue is
a direct way of reaching a problem which otherwise can be
attacked circuitously-if the motion were addressed to this court
we could remand with directions to the district court to consider
it, or we could affirm subject to the district court's considering the
motion. Aldridge v. Union Bankers Insurance Co., 457 F.2d 501
(C.A.5, 1972). [Quoting Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542
F.2d 928, at 931 (5th Cir. 1976)]
In Oliver v. Home Indemnity Company, 470 F.2d 329, 330-331 (5th Cir. 1972),
recognizing that the movant brought his Rule 60(b) motion, "[a]fter the normal tenday period for amending final judgments had elapsed, but before the thirty-day period
for filing notice of appeal,...", the Court then stated:
The district court found that it could entertain Pruitt's motion for
reconsideration under the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, (footnote omitted) The district court adopted a
construction of that rule which read the term "mistake" to encompass
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judicial mistake in applying the appropriate law. This view of the rule
is that urged by the most noted commentators, 3 Barron & Holtzoff,
Federal Practice & Procedure, §1325 at 407 (Wright ed. 1958); 7 Moore's
Federal Practice, §60.22(3) (1971),.... (citations omitted)
The policy favoring such a construction is, of course, one aimed at
preventing the unnecessary wasting of energies by both appellate courts
and litigants. It seems that absent the chance of serious injury to the
rights of any party, the possible saving of judicial energies warrants the
use of such a discretionary reconsideration by the district court,
(footnote omitted)
Also see, Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 852 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir.
1988)

(Rule 60(b)(1) permits court to relieve party from final judgment for

inadvertence, inadvertence can be on part of court rather than parties), Pitts v.
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171, 173 (Utah 1977) (Differentiation between "mistake" and
"inadvertence" not germane), Welsh v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 595 F.Supp 844 (1984)
(Relief granted under Rule 60(b)(1) from judgment on grounds of judicial mistake,
legal or deliberative error), Rodriquez v. Bowen, 678 F.Supp. 1456 (E.D.Cal. 1988)
(Court may correct errors of law upon motion under Rule 60(b)(1), and Compton v.
Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1979) (Rule 60(b) does not confine
"mistake", for which vacation of judgment may be had, to mistake by the moving
party, especially if raised within the time allowed for appeal.)
B.

Alternatively to judicial nonclerical "mistake" of reason (1) of Rule
60(b): clause (7) of said rule, "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment", should apply in equity and
fairness.

If the Court determines for some reason that clause (1) of Rule 60(b) does not
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apply in this matter, Mr. Udy argues that his 60(b) motion justifies relief in equity
and fairness under clause (7).
1.

Utah Decisions

To Appellant's counsel's knowledge, there have been few decisions rendered in
Utah touching on clause (7) of URCP Rule 60(b). In one case, Laub v. South Central
Utah Telephone Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), the Court reviewed a Rule 60(b)(7)
motion for judicial nonclerical error, brought more than three months after entry of
judgment.

It concluded, "since subdivision (1) is appUcable to the instant case,

subdivision (7) cannot be used to circumvent the three-month filing period". Laub,
at 1308. In specifying the criteria under which clause (7) may be employed, the Court
stated:
Subdivision (7) is the residuary clause of rule 60(b); it embodies
three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than those listed
in subdivision (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time.
Laub, at 1306.
2.

Decisions from Other Jurisdictions.

By far the majority of motions brought under the residuary clause which have
been denied in other jurisdictions, have been so denied for failure to bring the
motions within the time requirements of clauses (1) through (6) of the rule to which
said motions actually applied. Resorting to the simple "reasonable" time requirement
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of clause (7) was to no avail for such motions. There should be no question by the
court that Mr. Udy's motion was made within the requisite time.
It should first be noted that clause (6) of the Federal RCP Rule 60(b) is
identical to clause (7) of Utah RCP Rule 60(b).
In Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1979), the Court
identifies the appropriateness of avoiding an exact categorization of clauses when
moving under Rule 60(b) or alternatively asserting multiple clauses in support of the
motion.12 It then notes that,
Subdivision (b)(6) authorized relief for "any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment." This has been described as
the "catch-all" clause (citation omitted), because it provides the court
with "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular
12

These grounds for relief often overlap and it is
difficult, if not inappropriate, in many cases to specify or
restrict the claim for relief to a particular itemized ground. As
one court has well put it, "[t]he rule [60(b)] is broadly phrased
and many of the itemized grounds are overlapping, freeing Courts to
do justice in hard cases where the circumstances generally measure
up to one or more of the itemized grounds." In fact, Professor
Moore has suggested that exact "categorization" of ground for
relief under the rule "should be avoided except where the categoryis obvious or where exact choice is necessary to decision." 7
Moore's Federal Practice §60.27[1] at pp. 346-47. But where the
movant has shown a meritorious defense, the itemized grounds for
relief under the rule "are to be liberally construed...". * * * In
short, any considerations of the need "to expedite cases, to fully
utilize the court's time, to reduce overcrowded calendars and to
establish finality of judgments * * * should never be used to
thwart the objective of the blind goddess" of justice itself.
(Citation omitted)
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case/1 7 Moore, §60.27[2] at 375 (citation omitted), and "vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such
action is appropriate to accomplish justice," Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. at 615, 69 S.Ct. at 390, where relief might not be available
under any other clause in 60(b), (citation omitted). This is just such an
extraordinary case where this "catch-all ground was intended to afford
relief (Emphasis in original) (At 106-107)
In Compton the trial judge simply misconstrued the applicable statute and
entered judgment in an amount far in excess of that allowed thereunder:
Unfortunately, the district judge completely misconstrued the
statute in question. In correcting his mistake and in relieving the
defendant of an invalid judgment in an unconscionable amount, we are
doing what we are convinced the district judge in this case would have
done himself, had he not misconstrued the statute. But, whether this
be true or not, fundamental fairness and considerations ofjustice, apart
from any question of the voidness of the judgment as a matter of law,
command that the judgment for statutory penalty wages be vacated. (At
107)
In the instant case, when the trial judge ruled at the conclusion of the trial and
later on Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b) motion, he likewise misconstrued the governing statute
concerning the amount of child support appropriate under the residential/parenting
schedule ordered. A joint custody worksheet should have been used to calculate child
support. Fundamental fairness and consideration of justice command that Mr. Udy
pay $53.00, or at best $112.00, not $273.00 per month, to Mrs. Udy.
In United States v. Miller,

9 F.R.D 506 (1949), the Court granted the

defendants' motion to vacate judgment where plaintiff sought,
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to enforce against the defendants treble damages on an alleged violation
predicated on a pure guess as to the base amount of the sales for a given
period. This to my mind is clearly unconscionable and places the case
squarely within the purview of the sixth category of Amended Rule 60(b)
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
(emphasis added)
The Miller court found that the judgment entered was not for a sum certain
as required by rule. In the instant case, ordering the calculation of child support
using a sole-custody worksheet, was predicated on a pure guess that the label of a
sole-custody award to Mrs. Udy, overrode the "Joint physical custody" definition of
Utah Code Section 78-45-2(7).
See also, In Re Crafty Fox, Ltd.,

3 B.R. 657, 661 (1980)

(Ordering

reconsideration ofjudgment challenged under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) for misapplication
of law relating to attorney's fees.), United States v. McDonald, 86 F.R.D. 204, 206
and 209) (1980) (Amending foreclosure order under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) to include
appellants'

homestead

interest

finding

facts

to

constitute

"exceptional

circumstances".), United States v. Cato Brothers, Inc., 273 f.2d 153 (4th Cir 1959)
(Subsection (6) of FRCP 60(b) should be applied in liberal spirit and take into
consideration all of the circumstances of the case.)
CONCLUSION
Mr. Udy is responsible for caring for Joshua 46% of the total time and 33% of
the overnights. Due to said schedule Mr. Udy contributes more than Three Hundred
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Dollars ($300.00) per month directly to the financial benefit of Joshua. Under the
child support guidelines definition of "joint physical custody", the aforesaid factors
dictate that a "joint-custody worksheet" be used in calculating child support. The trial
Court erred in ordering the parties to calculate child support by using a "sole-custody
worksheet under the facts of this case.
The trial Court's order deviates from the child support guidelines. The trial
Court made no findings which support a deviation from the guideUnes, nor any
findings showing why the guidelines should be rebutted in this case.
Mr. Udy properly brought his Rule 60 Motion before the trial Court to correct
its legal, non-clerical error. The trial Court erred in denying his Rule 60 motion.
This Court should reverse the trial Court's order of using a "sole-custody
worksheet" to calculate child support and direct the trial court to compute child
support using a "joint-physical custody" worksheet.

The trial Court should be

directed to enter a support order of $53.00 per month based on the 46% total time
Mr. Udy is responsible for caring for Joshua. In the alternative, the trial Court
should be directed to enter a support order for $112.00 per month based on the 33%
of the overnights Joshua spends with Mr. Udy.
In the alternative to reversal, this Court should remand this matter to the trial
Court with directions to enter findings which may support a deviation from the child
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support guidelines and which could rebut the presumption of the guidelines being
applicable to the facts of this case.
Respectfully submitted this

day ofcAprrl, 1994.

irne
Jeff
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Q
day of
1994, I mailed by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:
Marlin J. Grant, #4581
OLSON & HOGAN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
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Jeff R. Thorne of Mann, Hadfield and Thorne, 3250
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRADLEY J. UDY,

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No. 924000268DA

REBECCA UDY,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on September
1, 1993 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. before the Honorable
Gordon J. Low, District Judge, presiding and sitting without a
jury.

The plaintiff was personally present in court and was

represented by his counsel of record, Jeff R. Thorne of the firm
of Mann, Hadfield and Thorne.

The defendant was personally

present in court and was represented by her counsel of record,
Marlin J. Grant of the firm of Olson & Hoggan.

The plaintiff was

sworn and testified and presented his evidence by way of
additional witnesses and exhibits, and the defendant testified
and presented her evidence by way of additional witnesses and
exhibits.

The court having entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, it is hereby,

.... . . ,/fa^O(^)(rV. ^k>

DEC

) 1993

*v -\L ^ U ^ K J ^ Q

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The plaintiff shall be awarded a decree of divorce from the
defendant; said divorce to become final upon signing by the
court.
2.

CUSTODY

The care, custody and control of the minor child, JOSHUA J.
UDY, born August 1, 1990, shall be awarded to the defendant.
3.

VISITATION

The court will adopt the legislative guidelines for
visitation as promulgated under UTAH CODE ANN §30-3-35, and in
addition will give the following expanded visitation:
(a)

On the weekend in which the father will have

the child, he may pick the child up Wednesday evening
at 6:30 p.m. and may keep the child Thursday, Friday,
Saturday, and shall return the child Sunday at 7:00
p.m. to the mother's home.
(b)

On the week when the father does not have the

child for his weekend, he shall be entitled to have the
child Wednesday evening from 3:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
4.

CHILD SUPPORT

The court shall calculate child support based upon a sole
custody worksheet.

For purposes of computing the child support
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worksheet, the father will have gross income of $2,786.00 per
month and the mother will have gross income of $1,720.00 per
month; the father will receive a credit of $22.00 per month for
medical insurance which he provides, which leaves the plaintiff
to pay the sum of $273.00 per month as and for child support for
the minor child.
5.

CHILD CARE

Presently the defendant is working and is required to obtain
child care for the child during the time she works.

Each party

shall be responsible to pay one-half of any child care costs
reasonably incurred to enable the defendant to work.

The child

care expenses shall follow UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.16 (as
amended).
6.

HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Each party shall be obligated to provide medical and dental
insurance coverage on the minor child of the parties, so long as
such insurance coverage is available to each through his or her
place of employment.

The mother shall have primary

responsibility to provide health and accident insurance, and the
father shall have secondary responsibility.

The parties shall

each pay one-half of any medical, dental, orthodontic or
optometric expense incurred for the child not paid by insurance.
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7.

LIFE INSURANCE

The plaintiff shall maintain the life insurance policy
(death benefit) on his life in the amount presently in effect
which is available to him as group term benefit through his
employment at La-Z-Boy.

The plaintiff shall pay or cause to be

paid the premiums thereon and shall designate the minor child of
the parties as the beneficiary on said life insurance policy.
Said life insurance policy and the beneficiary designation shall
remain in full force and effect until the child reaches the age
of 18. The plaintiff shall have the right to add additional
children he may obtain through natural birth or adoption to
equally share the proceeds.

It is the intent of the court that

said insurance is to guarantee child support in the event of
plaintiff's death.

Should the plaintiff obtain other employment

where group term insurance is available to him at the same cost
or less cost as he presently pays, the obligation to provide
insurance shall remain in effect through his subsequent
employers.
8.

TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION

The defendant as custodial parent shall be entitled to the
tax dependency exemption on the minor child of the parties.
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9.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

The plaintiff shall be awarded as his sole and separate
property from the marriage all property in his possession and
defendant shall keep all property in her possession.

It being

the finding of the court that the division as set out herein is
equal and fair to each party and each party is receiving equal
value.
10.

REAL PROPERTY

prior to the marriage the plaintiff purchased a home which
was used by the parties as their marital home.

The court finds

that there has been very little if any equity accrued in the
property during the parties were married.

The court shall award

the home and property to the plaintiff free and clear of any
claim or interest of the defendant.
11.

RETIREMENT BENEFITS

The plaintiff has accrued a retirement benefit and a 4OIK
benefit through his employment at La-Z-Boy Corporation.

He shall

be entitled to all of his retirement benefits free and clear of
any claim of the defendant.

The defendant has acquired a

retirement benefit and 4OIK benefit through her employment at LaZ-Boy Corporation.

She shall be entitled to her retirement

benefits free and clear of any claim of the defendant.
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12.

DEBTS

The only debt incurred during the time the parties were
married is the indebtedness on the home of the parties.

The

plaintiff shall assume and discharge the mortgage on the family
home and shall hold and save harmless the defendant from any
liability thereon.

Each party shall be responsible for any debts

each may have incurred since the separation of the parties and
shall be obligated to pay the same and hold and save harmless the
other from any liability.
13.

ALIMONY

The court notes that this has been a short term marriage
and, therefore, finds that the defendant is not entitled to any
permanent alimony by virtue of the fact that the marriage has
been short term.

The court further notes that the defendant is

employed gainfully and has been gainfully employed through the
marriage; the defendant has not suffered any economic
disadvantage by virtue of the marriage and, therefore, the
defendant would not qualify for any short term rehabilitative
alimony, or any other short term alimony.

Therefore, no alimony

shall be awarded to defendant.
14.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT OF ASSETS

Testimony was received that the defendant has incurred
attorney's fees in excess of $5,000.00.
6

The court notes that the

plaintiff also has incurred attorney's fees in a similar amount.
The court further notes that the parties have expended additional
monies for home studies.

The plaintiff further claims and the

court does find that at the time of entering into the marriage
the plaintiff had approximately $3,000.0 in savings, which always
was maintained during the time the parties were married, and had
another approximately $3,000.00 in checking which was contributed
to the marriage.

The court further notes that the plaintiff has

earned during the time the divorce was filed up to the time of
the trial an additional $6,000.00 over and above what the
defendant has earned.

Accordingly, the court will order that the

plaintiff pay to the defendant the sum of $1,500.00 to equalize
the savings differential and earnings differential as well as
attorney fees.

Judgment may enter against the plaintiff in favor

of the defendant in the amount of $1,500.00 which shall accrue
interest after signing at the judgment rate.
15.

DIVORCE FINAL UPON SIGNING

Good cause appearing to the court, this divorce decree shall
become final upon signing by the court.
DATED this

M^

day of October, 1993.

GORDON J. LOW
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of November, 1993, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to
Marlin J. Grant, Attorney for Defendant, 123 East Main, P. 0. Box
115, Tremonton, Utah 84337.

n
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
OLSON Sc HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
BRADLEY J. UDY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
REBECCA UDY,
Civil No. 924000268
Defendant.

Plaintiff filed a motion to have the Court reconsider,
pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60, Plaintiff's request to base child
support upon a joint custody worksheet.
Defendant filed an
objection.
The Court has review the arguments and based on
Defendant's objections and arguments cited therein orders as
follows:
1. Plaintiff's motion is denied.
2. Child support will be as ordered in the Decree of Divorce,
based on a sole custody worksheet for the reasons set forth in
Defendant's response.
DATED this

?

day of December, 1993.

Judge Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge

OLSON & HOGGAN P C
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
66 WEST CENTER

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

P O BOX 529
LOGAN UTAH 6 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
( 6 0 1 ) 7 5 2 1551

TREMONTON OFTICE
I 2 3 EAST MAIN
PO

BOX 1 1 5

ju^
Jeff\j£y thorne
Attorney for Plaintiff

.*. Uu^!±L^

TREMONTON UTAH 6 4 3 3 7
(601)257 3665

CfC JJ31993
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BUDGET

Mountain Fuel
Utah Power & Light
Tremonton City
Insight Cable
GTE Telephone
Life Insurance
House Payment
Kidsland Daycare
Child Support
Food for Josh and Brad
Clothes - Brad
Clothes - Josh
Josh's Book Club
Automotive Expenses
Gift Fund
Misc. Spending Money
Emergency Fund - Savings
Doctor/Dentist/Medication

$

44.95
17.78
30.82
38.35
28.49
30.00
461.50
118.44
275.00
148.01
33.33
20.83
13.00
113.88
79.17
173.33
216.67
43.82

$1,887.37

PLAINTIFF
EXHIBIT;•f-93\

I

Explaination of Monthly Budget

1992
Mt. Fuel
Ut Power
City
GTE
Cable
Life Ins

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

1993
Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

12.89
25.13
42.55
27.32
38.35
30.00

19.49
11.32
29.75
30.02
38.35
30.00

38.88
16.92
29.75
32.18
38.35
30.00

81.67
17.66
29.75
27.21
38.35
30.00

95.29
22.07
29.75
26.00
38.35
30.00

88.83
18.50
29.75
28.91
38.35
30.00

79.45
13.41
29.75
32.99
38.35
30.00

47.34
17.14
29.75
29.04
38.35
30.00

35.04
16.24
29.75
27.18
38.35
30.00

15.32
14.90
29.75
28.18
38.35
30.00

House payment
Kidsland Daycare
Child Support
Food-Josh & Brad
Clothes - Brad
Clothes - Josh
Josh's Book Club

Auto Expenses
Gift Fund
Misc. Spending
Savings
Medical

$213. 00 bi-weekly $213 x 26 = $5,538. 00 =
From 1--1-93 thru 6-3C>-93, I paid a total of

June

July

13.64
22.00
29.75
29.66
38.35
30.00

11.53
18.04
29.75
23.17
38.35
30.00

Month
Ave.
44.95
17.78
30.82
28.49
38.35
30.00

$1 461.50
$

710.64

From 8--1-92 thru 8-1- 93, I spent a total of
$1,776. 12
From 8--1-92 thru 8-1- 93, I spent approximately $400. 00
From 8--1-92 thru 8-1- 93, I spent approximately $250. 00

f

6

- 12
* 12
f 12

=
=

118.44
275.00
148.01
33.33
20.83
13.00

as

=
=

Insurance $594.60, Gas $450, Service $80,
License $121.96, Inspection, $20, Repair $100 = $1,366.56 f 12
Xmas,B-Day,M/F Day immediate family = $200, Josh $300,
Brad $200, Grandparents $120, Nieces & Nephews $90,
Friends, misc. $40, = $950.00
f 12 =
Dining out, work breaks, recreation, misc. $40 per week
x 52 = $2080
Josh's college, unexpected expenses, truck downpayment, vacation,
future investments, emergency fund-maintain 6 months wages in
case of lost employment @ $50.00 per week x 52 = $2,600
: 12 =
From 8-1-92 thru 8-1-93, I spent approximately $525.84
f 12 =

113.88

r

12

«

79. 17
173.,33
216,.67
43 .82

$1,877.37
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78-44-40

UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-1. Short title.

History: C. 1953, 79-44-39, e n a c t e d by L.
1983, c h . 164, ft 1.

This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.

78-44-40. Application and construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter
among states enacting it.
History: C. 1953, 78-44-40, e n a c t e d by L.
1983, ch. 164, 9 1.
Severability C l a u s e s . — Section 2 of Laws
1983, ch 164 provided "If any provision of this
chapter or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the

invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of this chapter which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable w

CHAPTER 45
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
SUPPORT ACT
Section
78-45-1
78 45-2
78-45-3
78-45 4
78 45 4 1

78-45-4 2

78-45-4 3
78-45 5
78-45-6
78-45-7
78-45-7 1

78-45-7 2
78 45-7 3
78-45-7 4
78 45 7 5
78 45 7 6

Short title
Definitions
Duty of man
Duty of woman
Duty of stepparent to support
stepchild — Effect of termination of marriage or common law relationship
Natural or adoptive parent has
primary obligation of support
— Right of stepparent to recover support
Ward of state — Primary obligation to support
Duty of obligor regardless of
presence or residence of obligee
District court jurisdiction
Determination of amount of
support — Rebuttable guidelines
Medical and dental expenses of
dependent children — Assigning responsibility
for
payment — Insurance coverage
Application of guidelines — Rebuttal
Procedure — Documentation —
Stipulation
Obligation — Adjusted gross income used
Determination of gross income
— Imputed income
Adjusted gross income

78-45-2

Section
78-45-7 7
78-45-7 8
78-45-7 9
78-45-7 10
78-45-7 11
78-45-7 12
78-45-7 13
78-45-7 14
78-45-7 15
78-45-7 16
78-45-7 17
78-45-7 18
78-45-7 19
78-45-8
78-45-9
78-45-9 1
78-45-9 2
78-45-10
78-45-11
78-45-12
78-45-13

Calculation of obligations
Split custody — Obligation calculations
Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations
Reduction when child becomes
18
Reduction for extended visitation
Income in excess of tables
Advisory committee — Membership and functions
Child support obligation table.
Medical and dental expenses —
Insurance
Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred
Child care costs
Limitation on amount of support ordered
Determination of parental liability
Continuing jurisdiction
Enforcement of right of support
Repealed
County attorney to assist obligee
Appeals
Husband and wife privileged
communication inapplicable
— Competency of spouses
Rights are in addition to those
presently existing
Interpretation and construction

History: L. 1957, ch. 110. f 1.
port Act are California, Maine, and New
Meaning of "this a c t " — The term "(tlhis
Hampshire
set," as used in this section, means Laws 1957,
Cross-References. — Income withholding,
ch 110, which enacted 18 78-45 1 to 78-45-4, ft* 62A 11-401 to 62A 11-414
78-45-5 to 78-45-7, 78-45-8, 78-45-9, and
Public support of children. W 62A-11-301 to
78-45-10 to 78-45-13
62A 11 332
Uniform Lawa. — Other jurisdictions
Uniform child custody jurisdiction, Chapter
adopting the Uniform Civil Liability for Sup45c of this title
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
B r i f h a m Young Law Review. — Note,
J W.F v Schoolcraft The Husband's Rights to
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law,
1989 B.Y U L Rev 955
A.L.R. — Postmajonty disability as reviving
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separation, 53 A L R 4th 22
Enforceability of premarital agreements
governing support or property rights upon divorce or
separation as afTected by circumstances surrounding execution — modern statU8 5 3 A L R 4 t h 8 5
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Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection
78-45-7.6(1).
(2) "Base child support award" means the award calculated using the
guidelines before additions for uninsured medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(3) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," or "table" means the table in Section 78-45-7 14
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter younger than 18 years of age and a
son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and
is without sufficient means.
(5) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension or
retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings specifically includes all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets.
(61 "Guidelines" means _the child support, guidelines in Sections
78-45-7.2 through 78-45-7.18.
(7) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paving child support.
(8) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed
(9) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support
(10) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a stepparent.

H-45-7.6

JUDICIAL CODE

lated to determine the average gross monthly income
(bt Each parent shall provide suitable docu
mentation of current earnings, including year todate pay stubs or employer statements Each parent shall supplement documentation of current
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least
the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income
from nonearned sources according to the source
Verification of income from records maintained
by the'Office of Employment Security may be
•substituted for employer statements and income
tax returns
<c> Historical and current earnings shall be
used to determine whether an underemployment
or overemployment situation exists
<fi> Gross income includes income imputed to the
arent under Subsection (7)
<7> <a> Income may not be imputed to a parent un
less the parent stipulates to the amount imputed
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed
<b) If income is imputed to a parent, the in
tome shall be based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as derived from work his
tnrv occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community
<c» If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40 hour work week To impute
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation
«d» Income may not be imputed if any of the
following conditions exist
(iI the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn,
(n> a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage,
<iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills,
or
(ivi unusual emotional or physical needs
of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home
<8> ia> Gross income may not include the earnings
of a child who is the subject of a child support
award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income
«b» Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited
as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount
against the potential obligation of that parent
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case
itto
8 45-7 6 Adjusted gross income.
11» As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in
ome' is the amount calculated by subtracting from
TOSS income alimony previously ordered and paid
nd child support previously ordered
• 2> The guidelines do not reduce the total child

parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding In establishing alimony, the court shall consider
that in determining the child support, the guidelines
do not provide a deduction from gross income for alimony
isss
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted
gross incomes
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and
split custody as defined in Section 78-45 2, the total
child support award shall be determined as follows
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income, and subtracting
from the products the children's portion of any
monthly payments made directly by each parent
for medical and dental insurance premiums
(c) Allocate monthly work related child care
costs equally to each parent
<d> Calculate the total child support award by
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the
base child support obligation calculated in Subsection (2Kb) and the amount allocated in Subsection (2Mc> Include in the order both amounts
and the total child support award
(3) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for up
to ten children For more than ten children, additional amounts shall be added to the base child support obligation shown The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total number of
children, not an amount per child
itso
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the total child support
award shall be determined as follows
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table Allocate a portion of the calculated amount between the parents in proportion
to the number of children for whom each parent
has physical custody The amounts so calculated
are a tentative base child support obligation due
each parent from the other parent for support of
the child or children for whom each parent has
physical custody
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support
obligation due each parent by the percentage
that the other parent's adjusted gross income
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income
of both parents
(3) Subtract from the products in Subsection
<2) the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection
(31 from the larger amount to determine the base
child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related

JUDICIAL CODE
(6) Calculate the total child support award by
adding the base child support award calculated
in Subsection (41 and the amount allocated in
Subsection (5) Include both amounts and the
total child support award in the child support
order
ISM
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation
calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the total child
support award shall be determined as follows
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of com
bined adjusted gross income The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obhga
tion due from each parent for support of the chil
dren
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child
support obligation by the percentage of time the
children spend with the other parent to deter-

mmr .fiflfii parent a tentative obligation to the
other parenl
(4) Subtract from the products in Subsection
(31 the children's portion of any monthly pay
ments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums
(51 Calculate the base child support award to
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser
amount calculated in Subsection (41 from the
larger amount
(61 Allocate the combined work-related child
care costs of the parents equally to each parent to
obtain the other parent's tentative child care obligation
(7) (a) Calculate the total child support award
that the parent determined to be the obligor
in Subsection (51 must pay when the obligee
has physical custody by
(i) adding the base child support
award calculated under Subsection (51.
and
(ii) adding the amount of the child
care obligation allocated to the obligor
in Subsection (61
(bl Calculate the total child support award
that the parent determined to be the obligor
in Subsection (5) must pay when that parent
has physical custody by
(il adding the base child support
award calculated under Subsection <5l,
and
(nl subtracting the amount of the
child care obligation allocated to the obligee in Subsection (6)
(8) Include the amounts determined in Subsections (7Hal and (b» and the two total child support
awards in the child support order
isss
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base
combined child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless other

78-45-7.14

(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child
amount derived from the base child support award
originally ordered
isss
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
<1> The child support order shall provide that the
base child support award be reduced bv 50** for each
child for time periods during which the order grants
specific extended visitation for that child for at least
25 of any 30 consecutive days Only the base child
support award is affected by the 50'* abatement The
amount to be paid for work related child care costs
may be suspended if the costs are not incurred during
the extended visitation
<2> For purposes of this section the per child
amount to which the abatement applies shall be cal
culated by dividing the base child support award by
the number of children included in the award
iseo
78-45-7.12 Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate
and just child support amount mav be ordered, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children
due support
isss
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership
and functions.
(Il On or before May 1, 1989 and May 1 1991. and
then on or before May 1 of every fourth year subse
quently. the governor shall appoint an advisory com
mtttee consisting of
(a) two representatives recommended by the
Office of Recovery Services
<b» two representatives recommended by the
Judicial Council,
<c) two representatives recommended by the
Utah State Bar Association and
<d) an uneven number of additional persons,
not to exceed five, who represent diverse inter
ests related to child support issues, as the gover
nor may consider appropriate However, none of
the individuals appointed under this subsection
may be members of the Utah State Bar Associa
tion
(21 (a) The advisory committee shall review the
child support guidelines to ensure their applies
tion results in the determination of appropriate
child support award amounts
(b) The committee shall report to the Legisla
tive Judiciary Interim Committee on or before
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or be
fore October I of every fourth year subsequently
<c> The committee's report shall include recom
mendations of the majority of the committee, as
well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee
(31 The committee members serve without compen
sation Staff for the committee shall be provided from
the existing budgets of the Department of Human
Services and the Judicial Council The committee
ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent
committee under this section is appointed
itto
78-45-7.14. Child support obligation table.
The following is the Base Combined Child Support
Okl >«•«»». T»W1»

Exhibit "E"

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY J. UDY
vs.

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY)

REBECCA UDY

Civil No, 924000268da
Mother

BASE AWARD CALCULATION
1. Number of natural and adopted
children of this mother and father
for whom support is to be awarded.

Father

Combined

^.•-•-•.•.•.•-•.•.•-•••-•«'

2. No. of nights children will spend
with each parent (must total 3 65).
3. Percentage of time each parent
has the children.

245

120

67.12 %

32.88 %

365

JH

IF LINE 3 IS 25% OR LESS FOR EITHER PARENT USE SOLE CUSTODY WORKSHEET.
4a. Gross monthly income.

1720

K^SSS:*

2786

4b. Previously ordered alimony paid-

«-:•:-:-:•>:-:

4c. Previously ordered child support.
4d. Optional: Share of Child Support
Obligation for children in present
home.
5. Adjusted monthly gross.

1720

2786

6. Base Combined Child Support Oblig.

-x«:::-x*x-:::*x,-:*A-:-x^W£x;

7. Percentage of COMBINED Obligation.

38.17 %

61.83 %

8. Each parent's share of Obligation.

182

295

9. Mother's obligation to father,

13. Subtotal child support award.

K-X-X-X-X-"

M-X-X-X-:

,,

X X*X'X<-X"X-X«X X-XO0,>

•2"2*A*s»A-A-:-A-:Wx£A-A%Wc

11. Children's portion of monthly medical and dental insurance premiums
paid to insurance company.
12. Total monthly childcare expense
for the children in line 1
incurred by either parent.

477

60
ta

10. Father's obligation to mother.

4506

198
"~"~"jE::«E:SS:$A

22

«•»:•:•

5$:£5SSx"$3

-S-X-;-5-3-X-X«X-S*X-I-w*X>,Xi»S!HC

60

14. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: OBLIGOR pays this to
OBLIGEE all 12 months of the year.
15. CHILD CARE AWARD: OBLIGOR'S share of child
care expense when actually incurred.

176
116
VAH 0O&L

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY)

BRADLEY J . UDY

vs.
REBECCA UDY:

Civil No. 924000268da

__

BASE AWARD CALCULATION
Number of natural and adopted
children of this mother and father
for whom support is to be awarded.
2. No. of nights children will spend
with each parent (must total 365),
3. Percentage of time each parent
has the children.

Father

Mother

Combined

»»>»;•

197

168

53.97 %

46.03 %

365

IF LINE 3 IS 25% OR LESS FOR EITHER PARENT USE SOLE CUSTODY WORKSHEET,
4a. Gross monthly income.

1720

2786

4b. Previously ordered alimony paid.
4c. Previously ordered child support.
4d. Optional: Share of Child Support
Obligation for children in present
home.
5. Adjusted monthly gross,

1720

2786

6. Base Combined Child Support Oblig.

:-»x->:»>»c->»r-»x-x«c« »

7. Percentage of COMBINED Obligation,

38.17 %

61.83 %

8. Each parent's share of Obligation.

182

295

9. Mother's obligation to father.
10. Father's obligation to mother.

477

13. Subtotal child support award.

c-»»»r«

br-^vw.-.*.':-.

84
>>>>C;>>X*>>>X^X,C*>>5*!l,C">

11. Children's portion of monthly medical and dental insurance premiums
paid to insurance company.
12. Total monthly childcare expense
for the children in line 1
incurred by either parent.

4506

|

159

22
»»i*>;->»»»r-»»»3<»>

84

14. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: OBLIGOR pays this to
OBLIGEE all 12 months of the year.
15. CHILD CARE AWARD: OBLIGOR'S share of child
care expense when actually incurred.

137
53

chqbo

Court granted visitation = 48 weeks
Sun.

Mon.

Sun.
Mon.
X
return
7:00 p.m.

Tue.

Wed.

Thurs.

X
X
6:00 p.m.
Tue. Wed. Thurs.
X
3:30 p.m.
10:00 p.m.

Fri. Sat.
X

X

Fri. Sat.

96

Overnight stays - Court granted visitation

24

Overnight stays - Four week summer visitation

120

Total overnight stays = 33 %

24

Additional days on Sundays from early morning until
7:00 p.m. - Court granted visitation

24

Additional days on Wednesdays from after work, 3:30 p.m.
until 10:00 p.m. - Court granted visitation

168

Days and Nights = 46 %

Q5HD0C&bS
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Exhibit "F"

lid-June 1991
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States with vanations to accomodate joint custody or
extended visitation

Alaska: Both for joint custody, and visitation over 27
consecutive days
Anzona: "...court may deviate from..guidelines...after
considenng...percentage of time each parent has physical
custody of the children,..."
Arkansas: " ..factors may warrant adjustments...The
extraordinary time spent with the non-custodial parent, or
shared or joint custody arrangements."
Colorado:: "Where each parent exercises extensive physical
custody....child support obligations be computed for each
parent...by the percentage of time the child spends with the
other parent the respective child support obligations are
then offset..."
Connecticut: "Joint or shared custody arrangements and
extended periods of visitation...have substantial impact on
the allocation of financial responsibilities...and should be
carefully explored."
Flonda: "It is the public policy of this state to assure that each
minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both
parents after the parents separate or the marnage of the
parties is dissolved and to encourage the parents to share
the nghts and responsibilities of childreanng." "The court
may adjust the minimum child support award....upon the
following considerations: The particular shared parental
arrangement, such as where the secondary residential
parent spends a great deal of time with the children thereby
reducing the financial expenditures incurred by the pnmary
residential parent..."
Georgia: " ..factors which may warrant such variations
include,...Shared physical custody arrangements, including
extended visitation;../
ie Joint Custody Association, Page 1

The Joint Custody Association, Page 2

Guam *lt is the intention of these guidelines to remove
financial incentives associated with custody and visitation
arrangements Shared custody shall warrant child support
less than provided in these guidelines only where the court
specifies and apportions an offsetting amount of the
children s expenses to the parent paying support" "Extra
expenses from shared or joint custody - Describe any
extraordinary expenses that will affect only the paying parent
in a joint/shared custody situation " "Visitation expenses Describe the anticipated visitation plan and related costs Tell
how you think the cost should be divided between the
parents M

Maryland "Shared pnysical custody means that each parent
keeps the child or children overnight for more than 35% of
the year and that both parents contnbute to the expenses of
the child or children in addition to the payment of child
support" "Each parent's share of the adjusted basic child
support obligation shall then be multiplied by the percentage
of time the child or children spend with the other parent tc
determine the theoretical basic child support obligation owec
to the other parent" M in addition if either parent incurs
child care expenses the expense shall be divided betweer
the parents in proportion to their respective adjusted actua
incomes "

Hawaii "Where parties share physical custody on an equal
basis, each will be considered to have the child for six
months dunng the course of a year" "To avoid unnecessary
transfers of funds, the "pay our of each parent for the year
should be determined by multiplying the monthly support
obligation times six months
the excess amnount shall be
divided .unless the parties agree otherwise." "For overnight
visitation more than 100 days, but not exactly 50/50 pint
custody (i.e 182 1/2 days) use ..formula:"

Massachusetts "Where the parties agree to shared physical
custody or the court determines that shared physical custody
is in the best interests of the children, these guidelines are
not applicable"

Idaho* "An adjustment for shared physical custody may be
made when each parent has the child more than 35% of the
year " "An adjustment assumes a true shanng, not just
extended visitation to take advantage of the thirty-five
percent threshold " " .may reduce the amount of support if
a parent has the child for thirty consecutive days or more A
reasonable reduction would be 50% for the duration of the
actual physical custodyM
Indiana " ..an infinite number of situations that may prompt a
judge to deviate from the Guideline amount....examples.
The children spend substantially more time with the
noncustodial parent than in the average case The custodial
parent has moved a substantial distance away and the
noncustodial parent will incur significant travel expemses in
visiting with the child"
Kansas "Any substantial and reasonable long-distance
transportation/communication costs directly associated with
visitation shall be considered by the Court The Court may
consider giving credit for the time spent with the
noncustodial parent, and when the time spent with the
noncustodial parent exceeds thirty (30%) of the child's time
or when the noncustodial parent has the child for a single
block of time (including custodial parent's visitation) in excess
of thirty days, the Court shall consider the increased costs to
the noncustodial parent and the savings of the custodial
parent and may adjust the child support accordingly"
" giving consideration to the....increased cost to the
noncustodial parent attributable to the child's visit Any
reduction shall not leave the custodial parent with less than
33% of the Combined Total Child Support Obligation"
Louisiana "In cases of joint custody, the court may consider
the penod of time spent by a child with the nondomiciliary
party as a basis for adjustment to the amount of child support
to be paid dunng that penod of time "

Minnesota "When children share substantial amounts ol
time with each parent, whether or not there is a pint physical
custody order, child suppport should be calculated by
offsetting the parties' support obligations Substantial shared
time with children translates into economic shanng beginning
when the parent with the lesser amount of time with the
children has the children in his/her care for a minimum of 128
overnights annually" "It is recommneded that every child
support order address the issue of visitation abatement"
Mississippi
. .the guidelines would be unjust or
inappropnate in a particular case...cntena The particular
shared parental arrangement, such as where the
noncustodial parent spends a great deal of time with the
children thereby reducing the financial expenditures
incurred by the custodial parent. "
Montana: "When the obligor parents share joint physical
custody (both parents have custody of the children more
than 30% of a 365 day penod), to avoid unnecessary transfer
of funds, the "pay over of each parent for the year should be
determined.."
Nebraska "Visitation adjustments or direct cost shanng
should be specified in the support order Dunng visitation
penods of 4 or more weeks, support payments may ordinanly
be reduced by 50% When a specific provision for joint
physaal custody is ordered, support may be calculated ."
Nevada "...court shall consider the following factors when
adjusting the amount of support....The cost of transportation
of the child to and from visitation if the custodial parent
moved with the child from the junsdiction... The amount of
time the child spends with each parent"
New Hampshire "Special circumstances., may result in
adjustments ..split or shared custody arrangements,"
New Jersey These child support guidelines are intended
to be applied to cases having traditional custody and
visitation arrangements"

Maine " justify deviation from the support guidelines.. The
nonprimary residential care provider is in fact providing
pnmary residential care for more than 30% of the time on an
annual basts N
The Joint Custody Association, Page

New Mexico: "Shared responsibility means a custody
arrangement whereby each parent provides a suitable home
for the children of the parties, when the children spend at
least thirty percent of the year in each home and the parents
significantly share the duties, responsibilities and expenses
or parenting; " "Equal responsibility means a custody
arrangement identical to shared responsibility situations,
except that the children of the parties spend a minimum of
forty-five percent of the year in "each home." "In shared
responsibilirty situations, the parent with more responsibility
retains seventy-five percent of the direct expenses and the
parent with less responsibility retains twenty-five percent of
his share..." "In equal responsibility situations, each parent
retains one-half of his share of the basic child support
obligation for direct expenses."

Tennessee: "If the child(ren) is/are not staying overnight
with the obligor for the average visitation period of every
other weekend from Friday evening to Sunday evening, two
weeks during the summer and two weeks during holiday
pr^nods throughout the year, then an amount shall be added
to the percentage calculated in the above rule to
compensate the obligee for the cost of providing care tor the
child(ren) for the amount of time during the average visitation
period that the chiid(ren) are not with the obligor." There are
cases where guidelines are neither appropriate nor
equitable. Guidelines are inappropriate...in cases where
physical custody of the children) is more equitably divided
between the parties..."

Ohio: "For cases with split custody, third party custody, or
extensive sharing of physical custody, each parent's
calculated share of child support becomes the basis for
determining his or her legal child support obligation."

Utah: "Joint physical custody means the child stays with
each parent overnight tor more than 25% of the year, and
both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in
addition to paying child support. The total child support shall
be determined as follows:" Nine factors, or calculations, are
listed.

Oklahoma: "If the court adopts a joint custody plan...the
court shall have the authority...to accept a plan which
allocates the payment of actual expenses of the children
rather than designating one custodial parent the "payor" and
one the "payee"..."

Vermont: "Shared custody guidelines. The materials in this
section were developed outside the Agency of Human
Services as one possible approach to establishing support
where custody of a child is shared by both parents. These
materials may be useful in a partricuiar case, but are certainly
not required to be used."

Oregon: "Determine whether the shared custody rule...or
the split custody rule..apply. If they do, then apply them and
adjust each parent's child support obligation pursuant to the
applicable rule." "When by agreement..or by court order, the
child or children are expected to be in the physical custody of
the noncustodial parent more than 35% of all overnights, the
child support to be paid to the non custodial parent may be
reduced to recongize costts incured by the noncustodial
parent.." "Hearings officer or the court may reduce the
support amount to be paid by the noncustodial parent by a
percentage equal to twice the prercentage by which all
overnights with the noncustodial parent exceed 35 percent."
Pennsylvania: "Divided or split custody. Where one or more
children reside with each party, the guidelines for "spouse
and children" will be used instead of the guidelines for
children only,..." "...a non-custodial parent's support
obligation should be reduced only if that parent spends an
unusual amount of time with the children."
Rhode island: "Since the guidelines do not specifically
address or consider cases involving split custody, third party
custody or extensive sharing of physical custody, the court,
in exercise of its broad discretion, may find it necessary to
deviate from the guidelines."

Virginia: "...factors affecting the obligation and the ability of
each party to provide child support: Arrangements regarding
custody of the children."
Washington: "Basic child support shall be allocated between
the parents when a child stays overnight with the parent over
twenty-five percent (25%) of the year. When this adjustment
is sought, and the parents are not in agreement, the parent
seeking the adjustment shall provide evidence to
demonstrate the parents' actual past involvement with the
child." "Residential schedule credit: For father's residential
schedule credit enter the amount listed on Worksheet B, line
26."
West Virginia: "Where parents share physical joint custody
on an equal basis, each shall be considered to have the child
for six months during the course of year. To avoid
unnecessary transfers of funds, the "pay out" of each parent
for the year should be determined..."
Wisconsin: "Shared time payer means a payer who is not the
primary custodian but who provides overnight child care
beyond the threshold and assumes all variable child care
costs in proportion to the number of days he or she cares for
the child under the shared-time arrangement."

South Carolina: "After a review of various child support
models that deal with joint custody arrangements, the Child
Support Guidelines Subcommittee decided that an equitable
and adequate amount of child support could not be awarded
by using a guidelines formula in those cases involving joint
custody."
South Dakota: "Deviations may be made from the
schedule...any of...factors: The effect of custody and
visitation provisions including whether children share
substantial amounts of time with each parent."
The Joint Custody Association, Page 4

Exhibit "G"

Section 5. The Operation of the Guideline
A Preliminary View
|
5.3. Number of children per family
Data was collected concerning the number of children subject to each
order. This data is summarized in the following table.

1

Table 5-2

1

j

Number of Child Subject to Each Order

|

#of
Children

# of
Orders

%age of
Total
Orders

# of
Children

# of
Orders

%age of
Total
Orders

1 child

229

51.0

4 children

6

1.3

2 children

152

33.9

5 or more
children

6

1.3

56

12.5

1 3 children

'

As can be seen from this data, the great majority of cases involve fewer
than four children. This data lends further support for the
recommendation in section 9.11 that the Legislature might want to study
the increases in guideline orders for cases of more than three children
and consider the use of discretion in cases involving large numbers of

ehudren

-

rp-jLUf^-

5.4. Range of visitation
One of the significant factors affecting the amount of child support
ordered in a particular case is the amount of time the child spends with
each parent. 2 1 5 The guideline orders surveyed showed a range of
visitation as shown in the following table.
See Table 5-J
As can been seen from this data, the commonly held view that average
visitation in cases where there is non-zero visitation, gathers around the
2 0 percent range is true, at least as to this data sampling. While cases
that fall outside this normal range should be entitled to the full

215

See discussion in section 3.2.
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ection5. The Operation of the Guideline
A Preliminary View
|
1

Table 5-3
Range of Visitation

1
J

Amount of time children spend
with "non-custodial" parent

Number of Cases

Percentage of
Cases

Less than 5 percent

137

32

5 to 10 percent

35

8

11 to 15 percent

18

4

16 to 20 percent

162

38

21 to 25 percent

20

5

26 to 30 percent

20

5

31 to 35 percent

11

3

36 to 40 percent

10

2

1 41 to 45 percent

5

1

1 More than 45 percent

8

_2

J

adjustment, up or down, for the amount of visitation involved, it might
reduce t h e amount of litigation involved if the guideline provided a
"default" level of visitation of 20 percent which would apply in cases in
which the amount of visitation was not lower than 15 percent nor higher
than 25 percent. Given t h e reduced effect of the visitation adjustment
under the current guideline, this change may be desirable. 216

5.5

Disparity of income

The effect of t h e amount of visitation on the ultimate child support
guideline order varies, depending on the disparity between the income of
the two parents. If the parents have roughly equal income, the effect is
greater than if one parent has a significantly higher income than the
other.

216

s e e discussion of this recommendation in section 9.9.
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9.8. Simplified income and expense declaration
The primary factual document used by the court in determining child
support is the income and expense declaration of each party. 284 The
information sought by this form is comprehensive and it is designed to be
used in a variety of situations involving a marriage dissolution or child
support. As a consequence the form may be unnecessarily complex for
the "average" child support hearing. The advisory committee plans to
study whether a simplified income and expense declaration would be
helpful to the many litigants appearing in child support matters without
an attorney. Depending on the results of this study, a simplified form or
other instructional material may be developed.

9.9. "Default" visitation amount
As shown in section 5.4, the great majority of child support cases involve
visitation orders ranging between 15 and 25 percent. The child support
formula requires a specific amount of visitation to be used in each case.
If the amount of visitation were considered to be 2 0 percent in all cases
except where the actual amount exceeded 25 percent, or was below 15
percent, a set of tables could be developed to aid in the calculation of
child support. This "presumption" could also lessen disputes between
parents over relatively small amounts of visitation, either as part of the
child support proceeding or the child custody proceeding. 2 8 5

9.10.

Earning capacity alternative

California's guideline contains a simple provision permitting the court to
consider earning capacity in lieu of a parent's income. 2 8 6 Many states
have provisions specifying factors for the court to consider in
determining whether to use earning capacity instead of income. It would
be helpful if the factors used in other states, as well as the case law
provisions developed in California, were studied and the guideline revised

284

See discussion of this form and its attachments in sectons 4.2.9
through 4.2.12.

285

One result of the formula established by Senate Bill No. 3 7 0 was to
lessen the effect on the guideline of a relatively small change in the
amount of visiation.

286

Family Code section 4058(b).
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E x h i b i t "H"

Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
123 East Main
P.O. Box 115
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Telephone (801) 257-3885
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
BRADLEY J. UDY,
OBJECTION TO
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

JOINT CUSTODY SUPPORT WORKSHEET
vs.
REBECCA RUDD UDY,
Civil No. 92400268DA
Defendant•

Plaintiff/Husband filed for a Rule 60 and Rule 59 Motion to
Change the Child Support from a sole custody worksheet to a joint
custody worksheet.
Defendant/Wife objects to this Motion for these reasons:
1.
Plaintiff/Husband does not state under what theory the
Court should change the support (i.e. clerical error, accident or
surprise, newly discovered evidence, error in law, mistake,

excusable
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ATTORNEYS AT CAW
6 6 WEST CENTER
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neglect,

fraud, etc.)

. Defendant /Wife cannot imagine any

subsection of Rule 60 or 59 that Plaintiff/Husband could
justifiably make their argument.
Their argument is in fact a
request to have the Judge merely reconsider and make their old
argument.
2.
Plaintiff/Husband in fact advanced the theory that the
Court should use a joint custody worksheet (see Plaintiff's Status
Report, page 3, item 3, dated June l, 1993); (Plaintiff's Complaint
asking for joint custody); (Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause
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requesting joint custody support calculations). Plaintiff/Husband
has had his day in court and his chance to prove up why joint
custody child support should be ordered.
This matter is res
judicata. There needs to be an end to a court order.
3.
Defendant/Wife was in fact awarded sole custody in the
Order to Show Cause hearing held on October 8, 1992 and February
11, 1993. Defendant/Wife was also awarded sole custody in the
divorce on September 1, 1993. The Court had every right to follow
the sole custody child support schedule in those instances and
rightly did so.
4.
Only in cases of "joint physical custody" is a joint
physical custody support worksheet used. The court awarded sole
physical custody to Defendant/Wife and the standard statutory
visitation guidelines, but with some expanded visitation.
5.
"Joint physical custody" is defined as "the child stays
with each parent over night for more than twenty-five percent (25%)
of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the
child in addition to paying child support". U.C.A. §78-45-2(7)
Plaintiff/Husband had his chance to prove he is paying the expenses
of the child in addition to just paying child support and the Court
did not make any finding that Plaintiff/Husband paid extra support.
The Court basically found that Defendant/Wife was paying for the
child's expenses and ordered Plaintiff/Husband to pay sole custody
child support.
This was totally in line with the support
guidelines.
Plaintiff/Husband cannot re-argue his case just
because he failed to prove that he was contributing to the child's
expenses. The truth is Defendant/Wife pays all costs for clothing,
housing, and other basic needs for the child. Plaintiff/Husband
spends for the child's needs just like every other father who has
visitation.
6.
Defendant/Wife was not granted any alimony and she can
barely support herself and the child on $273.00 per month in child
support. Defendant/Wife spends in fact more than $273.00 per month

3
on the child.
It would be an abuse of justice to reduce the
support even more.
7.
Plaintiff/Husband has not filed an Affidavit to support
his
motion,
therefore,
Rule
59(c)
would
restrict
Plaintiff/Husband's Motion to Rule 59(a) 5, 6 or 7. The only
possible item Plaintiff/Husband could advance would be an error at
law since the damages are not excessive and the evidence was
clearly present when the Court made the decision so it was not
insufficient. The Court has the discretion, in awarding support,
to take factors into account such as primary residence, alimony,
child's needs, ability to pay for extra items (see U.C.A. §30-3-5;
§78-45-7). If the guidelines are rebutted, the Court can look at
all the factors in §78-45-7(3). The Court certainly considered
these factors as well as other equities in awarding child support
as it did. The award cannot therefore be challenged merely on an
error in application of the law.
8.
Rule 60(b) requires a showing of grounds, time lines,
plus the fact the Plaintiff/Husband would succeed on the merits of
his case.
Plaintiff/Husband had a chance to argue his merits
already and did not succeed. His Motion is really just a request
for reconsideration which is not allowed under the Rules. Drurv v.
Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Ut. 1966).
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Wife requests the Court to deny Plaintiff/Husband 's
Motion on the grounds it is not specific, fails to state proper
grounds for the Motion, is unsupported by affidavit; is just a
request for reconsideration and not proper under the rules, is
unsupported by the facts and the Court has already decided upon
Plaintiff/Husband's requests for joint support, denied the same and
it is res judicata. Plaintiff/Husband's proper remedy is an appeal
if he is not satisfied with the Court's first ruling.
Defendant/Wife requests her attorney fees to defend against
this Motion in the sum of $300.00.

4
DATED this

/ 2-

day of October, 1993.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Marlin J. Grant

A**JL

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Joint Custody Support
Worksheet to Plaintiff's attorney, Jeff Thorne of MANN, HADFIELD &
THORNE, at 98 North Main, P. 0. Box 876, Brigham City, Utah 84302,
this /Z- day of October, 1993.

Marl in J. Grai^tf

udy.obj/m}g/div
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